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Abstract: This paper examines the mandatory compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements for listed companies in 
Macedonia, developing middle-income country with less developed capital market and weak enforcement environment for 
financial reporting. This transition economy introduced IFRS in 1998 and the study was conducted on a sample of 90 
companies that applied IFRS’s in their 2017 financial statements. We constructed both weighted and unweighted disclosure 
indices to measure the degree of compliance. The level of compliance was significantly greater for companies engaging 
international audit network firm and companies that were more leveraged. The findings did not support theories explaining 
compliance in developed capital markets and in countries with strong enforcement environment for financial reporting.  
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1. Introduction 
The paper investigates the compliance of listed companies with mandatory disclosure requirements of 
IFRS’s adopted as national accounting standards in Republic of Macedonia, a developing country with 
weak enforcement environment for financial reporting. Our study examines firm specific 
characteristics that determine variability in disclosure quality exercised by different listed companies.  
We have considered firm factors investigated as determinants of accounting practices in many 
countries with developed capital markets, but also incorporated in the study some factors that describe 
the economic setting of the country where financing of companies is predominantly bank-oriented and 
businesses (even listed companies) are tightly controlled among few dominant shareholders. We find 
insufficient overall compliance with IFRS requirements with significantly better disclosures in 
financial statements of companies that are pressured by engaged international audit network firm or to 
some extent are more leveraged and monitored by banks as capital providers.  
Macedonia is an example of a country that adopted IFRSs for mandatory use by all regulated 
businesses, all medium and large companies and has considerable track of experience in using IFRS’s 
in environment where most regulators have weak mechanisms in place for effective monitoring over 
compliance with IFRSs requirements. Our study concentrates on listed companies on the national 
stock market, a less developed market with very limited role in effective financing of companies who 
are traditionally raising credit from commercial banks.   
We contribute the previous literature on compliance with IFRS reporting requirements by providing 
analysis in respect of most frequent accounting standards relevant for the majority of companies, 
instead of focusing only on selected few accounting standards. Also, our study considers potential 
determinants of compliance such as ownership concentration and international audit network firms as 
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opposed to Big 4 auditors. These factors or their modalities were not usually tested in previous 
empirical analysis covering countries with more developed capital markets and are typical for the 
environment for financial reporting in Republic of Macedonia. The main research questions addressed 
in our empirical research are: 
- Do theories on accounting disclosure relevant in countries with more developed capital markets 
also apply for explaining disclosure quality in countries with weak enforcement environment? 
- What is the extent of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements of IFRS in transition 
country such as Macedonia? 
- What are the factors that determine the degree of compliance with disclosure requirements by 
Macedonian listed companies? 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In part 2 we provide an overview over institutional 
environment for financial reporting in Macedonia and some background data on adoption of IFRS’s in 
the country. Next, we perform a literature review on studies that address the issue of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements and factors that determine the degree of compliance. We have 
covered both studies in developed and less developed markets in order to build our hypothesis on 
determinants of compliance. In part 4 we present our empirical model and methodology of the 
research study.  In the next part we present and discuss the findings of our empirical and qualitative 
content analysis. The paper concludes with brief discussion of overall findings, contribution and 
limitations of the research study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Our research objective was to examine the quality of disclosure practices of Macedonian listed 
companies in accordance with IFRS requirements.  Specifically, we investigate firm-specific factors 
that determine the quality of disclosure practices. Research literature on disclosure practices is 
immense and mainly covers firm-specific and market-wide benefits from disclosure, real effects from 
disclosure practices in terms of investment decision-making and firm-specific and country-specific 
factors that influence the quality of disclosure. Application of quality financial reporting framework 
such as IFRS in comparison to local GAAP in European countries should result in increased 
transparency and international comparability of companies financial statements since IFRS are more 
capital-market oriented (e.g. EC Regulation No. 1606/2002). Daske and Gebhardt (2006) analysed the 
disclosure quality in financial statements of Austrian, German and Swiss companies following the 
adoption of IFRS and US GAAP as quality accounting standards. The authors provided evidence that 
the quality of disclosures and financial reporting has increased following both mandatory and 
voluntary adoption of IFRS.  
There is a considerable body of international research studies on disclosure practices of companies 
identifying factors on individual company level that determine the variations in the disclosure quality  
(size, industry, liquidity, profitability, corporate governance practices, quality of the auditor engaged 
etc.). Earlier studies in late 90’s and beginning of previous decade addressed voluntary disclosures (K. 
Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Cooke, 1989; Street & Gray, 2002), however since 2005/06 research studies 
started to investigate determinants of compliance with certain IFRS disclosure requirements (Glaum et 
al., 2013; Hodgdon et al., 2009; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Also, there are studies that investigate 
quality of IFRS reporting in different countries and tend to explain the variations in national practices 
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with firm-specific and country-specific factors. Glaum et al. (2013) analysed compliance with IFRS 3 
and IAS 36 requirements for large sample of European companies mandatorily applying IFRS. The 
authors provided evidence of significant non-compliance and identified the importance of firm-
specific factors such as prior experience with IFRS, type of auditor, presence of audit committees and 
ownership structure, the respective industry and issuance of shares or bonds in analysed periods. When 
it comes to country-specific factors Glaum et al. (2013) concluded that strong enforcement practices, 
the size of the national stock market and the strength of national traditions contribute better 
compliance with IFRS requirements.  
Our objective was to investigate the determinants of the quality of financial reporting of listed 
companies in Macedonia in terms of sound disclosure practices and application of IFRS accounting 
policies that oppose the tax influence and the dominance of historical cost accounting. Considering 
explanations provided above for the relevance of regulatory framework itself and firm specific 
incentives for quality financial reporting, we contemplated that firm specific factors act as 
determinants of the level of disclosure. We were motivated to examine whether early introduction of 
IFRS in financial reporting practice in 1998, over the past 20 years of application has resulted in good 
disclosure quality and financial transparency of companies.  
Companies’ disclosure decisions are shaped by the influence of various factors and have been 
explained through the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), litigation costs (Skinner, 1994), 
and proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983). Financial reporting can be considered as an element of 
corporate governance whose purpose is to reduce information asymmetry between the company 
management and investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). However, managers may feel reluctant to disclose 
more information in order not to compromise their competitive position or increase political costs.  
Reasoning provided by above mentioned theories is used to explain how different company specific 
characteristics are related to disclosure levels. Previous research consistently identified companies’ 
size being positively associated with the level of disclosure in their financial statements (Chalmers & 
Godfrey, 2004; Dumontier & Raffournier, 1998; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) explained that larger companies are associated with greater political costs and pressure to 
disclose information. Also, large companies have more resources to comply with complex IFRS 
reporting requirements and therefore the compliance costs are small burden for large companies. In 
this study we use total assets as a measure of the size of the companies. The following hypothesis tests 
the association between size and compliance with IFRS requirements. 
H.1  The level of compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements is positively associated 
with companies’ size. 
Prior research on disclosure quality and voluntary adoption of IFRS provided evidence of positive 
association between the quality of financial information and the type of auditor (Dumontier & 
Raffournier, 1998; Glaum et al., 2013; Glaum & Street, 2003). We thus expect compliance with IFRS 
disclosures to be higher for companies audited by Big 4 firms. Considering listed companies in 
Macedonia, the audit market is dominated by audit firms that are either Big 4 firms or belong to 
international network of firms. Being part of international network contributes the quality of internal 
processes and training for employed auditors that result in better audits. The variable AUD is coded 1 
if the auditor belongs a) to the Big 4 group b) is international network firm, and coded 0 if the audit 
firm is a local firm. Therefore for this independent variable we have formulated two alternative 
hypotheses: 
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H.2  The level of disclosure of information in financial statements is greater for companies audited 
by “Big 4” audit firm.  
H.2a  The level of disclosure of information in financial statements is greater for companies audited 
by audit firm part of international network.  
Companies with dispersed ownership choose to disclose more information in order to reduce the 
impact of these problems (Chau & Gray, 2002; Glaum et al., 2013). However, past research studies 
into the associations between ownership concentration and level of disclosure of information found 
evidence of inverted U-shaped relationship, meaning that companies with moderate levels of 
ownership concentration where investors hold large blocks of shares but individually do not fully 
control companies are most effective in controlling agency problems and exercise greater disclosure 
quality (Glaum et al., 2013; La Porta et al., 1998). We have measured ownership concentration 
(OWN) through the percentage of shares held by small number of shareholders as disclosed in audited 
financial statements. The following hypothesis is used to test for the association between ownership 
concentration and disclosure quality. 
H.3  Companies with moderate level of ownership concentration exercise greater level of 
disclosure quality.  
Many research studies investigated whether the capital structure or leverage of the company provides 
an incentive for the company to voluntary adopt IFRS or demonstrate greater compliance with 
mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements (Chalmers & Godfrey, 2004; Dumontier & Raffournier, 
1998; Hassan et al., 2008; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Wallace & Naser, 1995). Increase in leverage 
highlights the agency problem and potential transfer of wealth from debtholders to shareholders and 
management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Highly leveraged firms will need to manage the agency 
problem more efficiently and provide more disclosures in their financial statements. We use the debt 
to equity ratio as a measure of the leverage of the company (LEV). Nevertheless, we hypothesize 
without prejudice for the direction of the association between leverage and disclosure quality. 
H.4  The level of disclosures provided in financial statements depends on the leverage of the 
company.  
Several prior studies investigated the effect of firm profitability on the level of disclosure. Again, the 
results of the studies were mixed while some provided evidence of positive relationship (Wallace & 
Naser, 1995) considerable body of research find no evidence of association between profitability and 
level of IFRS disclosure compliance (Dumontier & Raffournier, 1998; Glaum & Street, 2003; Street & 
Gray, 2002). In this study we define profitability through return on assets, being net income divided by 
total assets of the company.  We hypothesize for positive association between profitability and 
disclosure quality. 
H.5  The level of compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements is positively associated 
with companies’ profitability. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
Content analysis was performed to listed companies audited financial statements, based on a list of 
disclosure and presentation requirements contained in several accounting standards considered as 
relevant and most frequently applied by domestic entities. We constructed a disclosure index based on 
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the disclosure index developed by Street and Gray (2002) and used by Hodgdon et al. (2008) to 
measure compliance with select IFRS and their respective disclosure requirements. The table 1.1 
illustrates the components of the IFRS disclosure index.  
Each disclosure requirement of relevant financial reporting standard was incorporated in disclosure 
checklist and then the checklist used as a tool to document a disclosure index score for each company. 
As shown in table 1.1 the disclosure index incorporated in total 180 separate information disclosure 
requirements. On the checklist the IFRS-required disclosure item was coded with 1 if the information 
was disclosed by the company, (0) for information not disclosed or (n/a) if the information had no 
relevance for the company.   We have calculated both, unweighted and weighted disclosure 
compliance score for each company. The unweighted IFRS compliance score is calculated by dividing 
the number of mandatory disclosures provided in the financial statements of the company with the 
number of applicable mandatory disclosures, presented as follows: 
      
where DIUN is the unweighted index score for company j; di,j indicates the disclosure of item i by 
company j; ri,j indicates whether the disclosure item is required for the company. 
Table 1.1. IFRS Components of Disclosure Index 
Standard  
 
Name of the standard 
Number of 
disclosures 
IAS 2  Inventories 9 
IAS 16 Property, plant and equipment 16 
IAS 17 Leases 5 
IAS 23  Borrowing costs 2 
IAS 24 Related parties 5 
IAS 33 Earnings per share 7 
IAS 36 Impairment of assets 18 
IAS 37 Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets 17 
IAS 38 Intangible assets 24 
IFRS 7 Financial instruments: disclosures 77 
  Maximum number of disclosures 180 
The implied assumption is that each item is equally important for any user of financial statements and 
this approach is followed in studies of Cooke (1989), Meek et al.(1995) and Raffournier (1997). The 
main argument here is that different users of financial statements may give different weights to 
different types of information depending on their different needs. However, some studies (Street & 
Gray, 2002) use also weighted indexes where the index score is calculated per standard basis with the 
final index score derived at by calculating mean results from all individual standard disclosure scores. 
This procedure allows for equal weight to be given to each financial reporting standard and its 
requirements, limiting the potential effect of non-compliance or compliance with the requirements of 
certain IFRS’s with larger number of information disclosure requirements.   Therefore the calculation 
of the weighted disclosure index (DI) is presented as follows: 
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where   Sij is the index score for i standard by company j;  Rj is the number of applicable standards for 
company j.   
According to the hypotheses given above, determinants of disclosure quality subject to testing are: the 
size of the company (SIZE), the type of auditor (AUD), ownership concentration (OWN), leverage 
(LEV) and profitability (PROFIT).  
Based on explanations presented above regarding dependent and independent variables, the research 
model that describes the actual disclosure index is defined according to the following equations: 
PROFIT; 
PROFIT 
where 
DIUN= is the unweighted disclosure index result of the company; 
DI = is the weighted disclosure index result of the company; 
SIZE = log of total assets; 
AUD= dummy variable for the audit firm; 1 for Big Four or International network firm, 0 for other 
audit firms; 
OWN= percentage of ownership concentration for shareholders in possession of more than 5% of 
common shares; 
LEV= ratio total debt/ book value of equity; 
PROFIT = return on assets calculated as net income divided by total assets of the company. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
The research started with identification of the listed companies on Macedonian Stock Exchange 
(MSE) and for the sample both mandatory and voluntary listed companies, where considered. Namely, 
in order to stimulate corporate transparency and attract more investors for trading at the MSE, in 2013 
the government requested considerable number of JSC’s to be listed on the national stock exchange 
and increase their transparency with potential investors. At the end of 2018 in total 105 companies 
were listed on the stock exchange. Eight banks and two insurance companies representing financial 
sector companies were omitted from the sample considering the purpose of the empirical research. 
Audited financial statements of sample companies were obtained from the MSE Seinet system for 
electronic distribution of information from listed companies. Following the review of 95 audited 
financial statements, 5 more companies were excluded from further analysis because of omitted 
important data.  
Table 1.2 shows the overall means and standard deviations for dependent and independent variables. 
The average disclosure index score for listed companies was 62,1% for the unweighted and 63,9% for 
the weighted disclosure index. Some listed companies provided as little as 22,6% of required 
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information, but some disclosed as much as 96,7%.  Considering standard deviations in disclosure 
indices, both weighted and unweighted indices approach provided similar results of large discrepancy 
among different listed entities in respect of the quality of their disclosures in audited financial 
statements. This means that listed entities in Macedonia still miss considerable amount of information 
that need to be disclosed if substantial compliance with IFRS requirements is pursued.     
Table 1.2. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
  N Min Max Mean  S.D 
Total assets (mil mkd) 90 73,8 9515,0 1743,0 2386,0 
Return on assets (ROA) 90 -0,200 0,298 0,007 0,067 
Total debt/ equity 90 0,576 1,382 0,960 0,207 
Ownership concentration  90 0,079 1,000 0,698 0,231 
Disclosure index - unweighted 
(DIUN) 
 90 
0,226 0,944 0,621 0,218 
Disclosure index weighted (DI)  90 0,321 0,967 0,639 0,163 
  N %       
Audit firm  
 
    „Big 4“ 12 13.3% 
   Others  78 86.7% 
   
 
 
    Audit firm2 
 
    International network 37 41.1% 
   Local firms 53 58.9%    
 
The descriptive statistics for the independent variables provide some insight into the domestic capital 
market and characteristics of listed companies. The average ownership concentration measured as 
percentage of stock owned by large shareholders (more than 5% of qualified interest in common 
stock) amounts to as high as 70%. This provides solid evidence for the tight ownership of companies 
with limited public interest and unfavourable environment for corporate transparency. In respect of the 
audit market, only 13,3% of listed companies are being audited by “Big 4” audit firm. This 
characteristic of the local market for audit services is uncommon in international setting, since many 
research papers report market share above 70% for “Big 4” audit firms (Dumontier & Raffournier, 
1998; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). However, considering all audit firms that are part of any 
international network of firms, the listed companies market share is bigger rising to 41,1% in 2015. 
Table 1.3 provides an overview of the disclosure index per each financial reporting standard. As it can 
be analysed companies comply substantially with the requirements of IAS 2 Inventories (92%), IAS 
16 Property, plant and equipment (87%) and IAS 38 Intangible assets (92%). Companies provided 
very poor information in respect of IAS 23 Borrowing costs requirements (2% of required information 
disclosed), IAS 24 Related parties (43%) and IAS 16 Leases (36%).  
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Table 1.3. Disclosure Index Statistics According to the Applicable IFRS 
Disclosure index  
No. of 
companies Mean max min 
IAS 2 Inventories 90 0,92 1,00 0,75 
IAS 16 Property, plant and equipment 90 0,87 1,00 0,54 
IAS 17  Leases 18 0,36 1,00 0,00 
IAS 23 Borrowing costs 69 0,02 0,50 0,00 
IAS 24 Related parties 82 0,43 1,00 0,00 
IAS 33 Earnings per share 90 0,62 1,00 0,00 
IAS 36 Impairment of assets 4 0,70 1,00 0,43 
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities 
and Contingent Assets 
67 0,88 1,00 0,38 
IAS 38 Intangible assets 41 0,92 1,00 0,62 
IFRS 7 Financial instruments: disclosures 90 0,57 1,00 0,12 
 
4.2. Multiple Regression Analysis 
In order to check for multivariate relationship between disclosure indices and independent variables 
we performed OLS regression analysis. The results obtained are presented in table 1.4, where we 
provided an appropriate regression coefficients and t-statistic data for each explanatory variable. In 
each regression we analysed for the possible presence of heteroscedasticity by applying the White 
general test (White, 1980), in which case consistent variances and standard errors were used. Two 
hypotheses were statistically validated for the unweighted index and only one for the weighted 
disclosure index as dependent variables. We identified significant association between the level of 
disclosure measured by both indices and the independent variable being audited by international audit 
network firm (H2a hypothesis). This finding is consistent with Glaum and Street (2003), Street and 
Gray (2002), Lopes and Rodrigues (2007), Glaum et al. (2013).  Also, hypothesis H.4 was validated 
with a positive coefficient for the unweighted index as dependent variable, meaning significant 
positive relationship between the leverage of listed companies and quality of disclosures in financial 
statements. This is inconsistent with the evidence provided by Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) who find 
no statistical significant relationship and Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) who provided evidence 
for significant negative relationship between the leverage and of the company and quality of 
disclosures. 
Table 1.4. Multiple Regression Analysis for Determinants of Compliance with IFRS Requirements 
      Unweighted Index   Weighted Index   
Hypothesis   Variable Coefficient 
t-
statistic   Coefficient 
t-
statistic   
H1 Size LogAss ,098 ,828 
 
,094 ,547 
 H2 Auditor Big 4 AUD4 ,086 ,727 
 
,117 ,678 
 
H3 
Own 
concentration OWN 
-,098 -,909 
 
-,130 -,826 
 H4 Leverage LEV ,649 5,690 * ,121 ,731 
 H5 Profitability ROA -,010 -,097 
 
-,022 -,143 
     Rsquare ,573     ,094     
    F stat 11,551     ,890     
      Unweighted Index   Weighted Index   
Hypothesis   Variable Coefficient t-   Coefficient t-   
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statistic statistic 
H1 Size LogAss ,022 ,222 
 
-,001 -,010 
 
H2a 
International 
Auditor 
AUDint ,510 3,915 * ,657 3,344 * 
H3 
Own 
concentration 
OWN -,068 -,752 
 
-,090 -,658 
 
H4 Leverage LEV ,349 2,778 * ,264 1,393 
 
H5 Profitability ROA ,002 ,027 
 
-,007 -,053 
 
    Rsquare ,681     ,273     
    F stat 18,401     3,231     
*Significant at 1% level; ** 5% level;  
 H1 which stated that the level of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements is positively 
associated with the size of the company is not supported by the regression results. This is consistent 
with the findings of Glaum and Street (2003), Street and Gray (2002) but inconsistent with Chalmers 
and Godfrey (2004) and Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) who find a statistically positive relationship 
between the size and disclosures for financial instruments.  
The results do not show significant influence of ownership structure (concentration) on the quality of 
disclosures provided in financial statements, meaning H3 is not supported. We have also checked for 
possible u-shape relationship (La Porta et al., 1998) since companies with widely dispersed ownership 
provide less information because small investors have little power to monitor management. Also, 
when there is a single dominant shareholder the level of disclosure can significantly decrease 
especially in countries with poor minority shareholders protection since the dominant shareholder has 
no interest in greater disclosure. Our results did not support for such u-shape relationship and this is 
inconsistent with the findings of Glaum et al. (2013) and La Porta et al. (1998). 
Also, our results have shown that profitability of reporting companies played no role for the quality of 
financial reporting, being the H5 hypothesis. This is consistent with the findings of Glaum and Street 
(2003) that also provided evidence that profitability does not influence significantly the degree of 
compliance with disclosure requirements. 
 
5. Conclusions  
The aim of the paper was to evaluate compliance with mandatory IFRS requirements by listed 
companies in South Eastern European country that adopted IFRS as national accounting standards. 
Macedonia is a country that adopted full IFRS for mandatory use by all regulated companies including 
all medium and large companies since 1998. However, we have argued that mandating IFRS 
application through national legislation is not sufficient to achieve compliance with IFRS disclosure 
requirements and quality financial reporting, when there is lack of enforcement institutions and 
mechanisms in place. In such case, company specific factors can act as powerful determinants of 
disclosure quality and compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements.  
Based on prior literature on determinants of disclosure practices and compliance with IFRS 
requirements we have formulated set of hypotheses and tested on 90 listed companies in Macedonia. 
Considering the requirements of selected IFRS’s, both unweighted and weighted disclosure indices 
were constructed to serve as dependent variables in order to investigate companies’ specific factors 
that influence the quality of disclosure. The multivariate analysis covering the investigated factors 
revealed that companies that engage international audit network firms and are more leveraged exercise 
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greater compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements. Inversely, no significant relationship was 
found for profitability, ownership concentration and size of companies. The scores for the constructed 
disclosure indices have shown that on average Macedonian listed companies comply with 62-64% of 
the disclosure requirements of relevant IFRS’s with individual company scores ranging from 23% to 
94%. Although our results have shown that a quality auditor supports better disclosure practices, the 
lack of institutional enforcement practices over financial reporting limits overall disclosure quality.  
The results of the study should be interpreted with caution, considering the applied methodology and 
the sample data. Results should not be considered as representative for financial reporting of all 
companies in the country, since companies which are not listed and have not provided financial 
information available to the general public were not considered in the study. Secondly, the study 
concentrates on the level of compliance with disclosure requirements of selected IFRS’s, not all of 
IFRS’s applicable to certain type of companies or transactions. Third, in order to appropriately argue 
for the quality of financial reporting practices it would be also relevant to examine compliance with 
IFRS presentation and measurement rules.  
Published financial statements and other financial reporting information publicly available does not 
allow for complete and unbiased analysis whether measurement principles and rules of accounting 
standards are applied consistently and appropriately. Fourth, the compliance of companies with IFRS 
reporting requirements may be influenced by factors that were not included in the core model or 
considered in the literature review of the study. 
The study contributes to the literature that addresses the issues of compliance with accounting 
standards disclosure requirements and adoption of IFRS in code-law countries with weak enforcement 
mechanisms in place. Our study has implication for investors and other capital providers by providing 
evidence of significant differences in the overall quality of disclosed financial information. This limits 
comparability and poses a threat for investing decisions of capital providers. Secondly, our research 
results should inspire supervisory authorities and policy makers in the country to increase their efforts 
to consistently enforce application of accounting standards adopted in order to benefit investors and 
other users of financial statements.  
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